蛋播视频一区,无码鲁丝一区二区,精品 久久 五月天,国产老熟女,五月草草在线观看,中文日韩欧美,情色一区二区三区,欧美日韩亚洲激情在线,亚洲制服在线香蕉

應(yīng)管理學(xué)院運(yùn)營與財務(wù)管理研究所羅勁博教授邀請，紐約城市大學(xué)李雪君教授將做客至公會計論壇，并帶來精彩報告。歡迎感興趣的老師和同學(xué)參加！

講座主題：Why Do Firms Withhold Loan Contract Details?

An Incomplete Contracting Explanation

主講人：李雪君 教授

主持人：羅勁博 教授

講座時間：2020年11月10日（星期二）

10:00—12:00

講座地點：Zoom線上會議

會議密碼：lzu

會議ID: 873 5762 6185

主講人簡介

李雪君，紐約城市大學(xué)柏魯克分校（Baruch College）會計系終身教授、博士生項目主管。本科畢業(yè)于清華大學(xué)經(jīng)管學(xué)院，碩士畢業(yè)于伊利諾伊大學(xué)香檳分校，并在密歇根州立大學(xué)獲會計學(xué)博士學(xué)位。曾任教于羅徹斯特大學(xué)西蒙商學(xué)院。主要研究領(lǐng)域是證券監(jiān)管、企業(yè)信息披露、媒體與資本市場。研究成果發(fā)表于The Accounting Review, Journal of Accounting Research, Journal of Accounting & Economics, Management Science等國際頂尖刊物。

講座簡介

Theory suggests that greater information asymmetry between firms and lenders entails allocating stronger decision rights to the latter through tighter covenants. While tighter covenants could be more likely violated, they are often relaxed later, upon contract renegotiation. We hypothesize that in such an incomplete contracting framework, greater information asymmetry gives firms more incentives to withhold information about the initial covenants from the public, to avoid overstating contractual constraints and preclude harmful reactions to violations that may be cured via renegotiations. We find evidence consistent with this hypothesis. Our findings are stronger when contracts likely contain more performance covenants to facilitate more frequent decision right transfers to lenders. Our inferences are robust to controlling for firms’ obligation to disclose (i.e., contract materiality), proprietary costs, and future performance. While prior research has long recognized that the details of a significant portion of loan contracts are not publicly available, we are the first to provide an explanation from the incomplete contracting perspective.