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中山大學(xué)嶺南學(xué)術(shù)論壇分經(jīng)濟(jì)、金融和管理三個(gè)系列，是定期邀請(qǐng)國內(nèi)外優(yōu)秀學(xué)者前來開展學(xué)術(shù)交流的平臺(tái)。每系列每個(gè)月定期舉辦2-3次。目前已經(jīng)成功舉辦多期，并得到了各界的高度評(píng)價(jià)。

第596期嶺南學(xué)術(shù)論壇

報(bào)告題目

Security-bid Auctions with Information Acquisition

報(bào)告人

李昱楠

香港城市大學(xué)助理教授

主持人

徐欣毅

中山大學(xué)嶺南學(xué)院助理教授

摘 要

We study security-bid auctions in which bidders compete for an asset by bidding with securities whose payments are contingent on the asset’s realized value and can covertly acquire information at some cost before participating in an auction. We first consider auctions with ordered securities in which the seller restricts the security design to an ordered set and uses a first- or second-price auction. We show that steeper securities give agents lower marginal returns to information and may yield lower revenues. We then study linear mechanisms in which payments linearly depend on the asset's realized value. We show that the revenue-maximizing linear mechanism assigns the asset efficiently. The winner pays in cash if their expected values are above a threshold and pays in stock if their expected values are below the threshold. The threshold decreases as the marginal cost of acquiring additional information increases. This result implies that stock payments are associated with lower merge synergies and lower information acquisition costs. We empirically test the implications and find consistent results.

報(bào)告人介紹

李 昱 楠

香港城市大學(xué)助理教授，2017年于美國賓夕法尼亞大學(xué)（University of Pennsylvania）獲得經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)博士學(xué)位。從事理論微觀經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的相關(guān)研究，主要包括機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)，拍賣理論，契約理論，以及信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)。其學(xué)術(shù)成果發(fā)表于(含forthcoming): Theoretical Economics,Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior，International Economic Review等經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)頂級(jí)期刊。擔(dān)任Econometrica, Theoretical Economics, Journal of Economic Theory, International Economic Review, Games and Economic Behavior, Economic Theory, Operations Research, European Economic Review, International Journal of Game Theory, Journal of Industrial Economics等國際知名期刊匿名審稿人。

主持人介紹

徐 欣 毅

中山大學(xué)嶺南學(xué)院經(jīng)濟(jì)系助理教授，香港中文大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)博士。從事理論微觀經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的相關(guān)研究，包括機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)，拍賣理論，契約理論。主持1項(xiàng)國家自然科學(xué)基金項(xiàng)目。

時(shí) 間

2021年12月10日（周五）

14:30-17:30

地 點(diǎn)

MBA樓902

語 言

中文+英文

騰訊會(huì)議ID

930-211-550

會(huì)議密碼：211210

騰訊會(huì)議鏈接

https://meeting.tencent.com/dm/p8vcQRZtpPxg

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