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2020華東師范大學

產(chǎn)業(yè)組織與行為經(jīng)濟學會議

2020ECNU Industrial Organization

andBehaviouralEconomics Workshop

時間：2020年12月26日地點：理科大樓A302會議室線上直播：會議號 ：582905537（騰訊會議）會議號：68031477763（Zoom會議）主辦單位：華東師范大學經(jīng)濟與管理學部

8：40-10：10

一、張紅松Hongsong Zhang, The University of Hong KongOvercoming Information Asymmetry with Insurance AdviceAbstract: This paper investigates the impact of the 2003 SARS epidemic on the markup of Chinese manufacturing rms. We theoretically show how inventory holding and demand uncertainty affect a firm's markup, by influencing the firms' dynamic production and pricing decisions. The model implies the necessity of accounting for the heterogeneity of inventory stock and demand uncertainty when measuring markup. Empirically, this paper finds that the accumulated inventory due to the SARS shock reduced the markup of Chinese manufacturing firms in the SARS-impacted areas. SARS also increased the magnitude of demand uncertainty faced by these firms, which further reduced their markup for a longer period.二、周曉嵐Xiaolan Zhou, East China Normal UniversityProportional vs. Unit Fees: Evidence from Patent Licensing Fees in China’s Smartphone MarketAbstract: We compare social welfare between proportional and unit fees, assuming that there is no change in the total patent licensing fees from China’s smartphone market. We divide consumers into four groups by their income. Under the unit fee, high-end smartphone companies pay less licensing fees at the expense of middle-end and low-end smartphone companies; high-income consumers become better off at the expense of low-income consumers; the average change in consumer welfare is negative. Our findings explain why most licensing contracts include royalties based on the entire market value (EMV) of the product rather the smallest saleable patent practicing unit (SSPPU).三、吳璠Fan Wu, Shanghai UniversityCancellation Clauses and Hold-up with Incomplete Contract: Theory and Experimental EvidenceAbstract: The hold-up problem is one of the most fundamental and enduring issues in the field of Behavioral Industrial Organization. Although incomplete contracts have been studied extensively, the literature is lacking empirical, and especially experimental evidence. This paper examines the effects of fixed cancellation payment on the hold-up problem through parameterized modelling and results of a lab experiment. Our experiment results conform to the equilibrium prediction in general: setting the cancellation payment too low can lead to agents being held-up, resulting in inefficiently low investment; setting it sufficiently high can enhance the agent's incentive and solve the hold-up problem, but setting it too high could lead to the agent to invest an inefficiently high amount, i.e. the reverse hold-up problem. Our study has important policy implications that carefully designed cancellation clauses could be harnessed by policymakers and mechanism designers to achieve outcomes that maximize social welfare; Another takeaway from our experiment is the learning effect, which also implies that policymakers could expect a contract regime to become increasingly effective over time.

10：30-12：00

四、陸卓然Zhuoran Lu, Fudan UniversitySelling SignalsAbstract:This paper studies a signaling model in which a strategic player can manipulate the signaling cost. A seller chooses a price schedule for a product, and a buyer with a hidden type chooses how much to purchase as a signal to receivers. When receivers observe the price schedule, the seller charges monopoly prices, and the buyer purchases less than the first-best. In contrast, when receivers do not observe the price schedule, the demand for signals is more elastic. Thus, the seller charges lower prices, and the buyer purchases more than in the observed case; those of the highest types purchase more than the first-best. The model suggests that price transparency benefits the seller but harms the buyer. The model can be applied to schools choosing tuition, retailers selling luxury goods and media companies selling advertising messages. Moreover, a novel equilibrium refinement rule is proposed in the paper.五、洪蘇婷Suting Hong, ShanghaiTech UniversityHeterogeneity in Venture Capital SyndicatesAbstract: We study motivations for venture capital (VC) firms to form heterogeneous syndicates in the contexts of early-round investments. Our theoretical model suggests entrepreneurs are concerned with likelihoods of VC firms to extract more advantageous terms by threatening not to reinvest in a follow-on round and thus sending negative signal about the quality of the project. Such threat becomes more severe for entrepreneurs who is less trusted by external investors, as well as for VC firms with higher expertise in project screening. We show that, for entrepreneurs with low credibility, they would rather accept funding from a syndicate consisting of VC firms of heterogeneous expertise levels, which indicates an intermediate level of average screening ability of all participating VC firms. Furthermore, we show that once a heterogeneous syndicate is formed entrepreneurs experience increased likelihoods to switch investors during a follow-on round. We test our theoretical predictions using a novel data set from Pitchbook of VC investments in the US, and find supportive evidence.六、從佳佳Jiajia Cong, Fudan UniversityData-driven Mergers and PersonalizationAbstract: Recent years have seen growing cases of data-driven tech mergers such as Google/Fitbit, in which a dominant digital platform acquires a relatively small firm possessing a large volume of consumer data. The digital platform can consolidate the consumer data with its existing data set from other services and use it for personalization in related markets. We develop a theoretical model to examine the impact of such mergers across the two markets that are related through a consumption synergy. The merger links the markets for data collection and data application, through which the digital platform can leverage its market power and hurt competitors in both markets. Personalization can lead to exploitation of some consumers in the market for data application. But insofar as competitors remain active, the merger increases total consumer surplus in both markets by intensifying competition. When the consumption synergy is large enough, the merger can result in monopolization of both markets, leading to further consumer harm when stand-alone competitors exit in the long run. Thus there is a trade-off where potential dynamic costs can outweigh static benefits. We also discuss policy implications by considering various merger remedies.

13：00-15：00

七、肖爾特Erte Xiao, Monash UniversityOvercoming Information Asymmetry with Insurance AdviceAbstract: We design a novel insurance advice mechanism aimed at promoting trust and cooperation in markets with asymmetric information. In a buyer-seller game, sellers are given the option to advise buyers whether to purchase third-party insurance against the potential losses from sellers’ noncooperative behavior. The theoretical model suggests that both cooperative and strategic sellers will advise buyers not to purchase the insurance. Once this advice has been given, strategic sellers are less likely to pursue self-interest due to the associated psychological costs. We conduct a controlled laboratory experiment and show that, the insurance advice mechanism significantly increases market efficiency, with sellers being likely to cooperate and buyers being likely to purchase from the seller.八、申培垚Peiyao Shen, ShanghaiTech UniversityTo Go Electric or to Burn Coal? A Field ExperimentAbstract: Coal heating in residential houses is an important source of outdoor and indoor air pollution in many countries. Switching to electric heating can greatly reduce air pollution and improve health. We conduct a field experiment to investigate channels of aversion to electric heating by sending 3 types of information containing either electricity cost, or health consequences of indoor coal heating, or social information on the heating methods adopted by others to households in rural villages in Northern China. We find that majority of households overestimate their electricity expense, and underestimate the health consequence of coal heating. We also find that, when households are given feedback on accurate electricity expense, the demand for electric heating decreases by 32 percent, and this effect is stronger for households who are concerned about the heating price, while it significantly increases the demand for electric heating for those who overestimate the energy cost. Providing information on the health consequences of coal heating increases the demand for electric heating by 15 percent, and the effect is more pronounced for those who are concerned about the health impact from coal heating, or underestimated the health consequences from coal heating. Moreover, providing social information on the heating methods chosen by others increases the demand for electric heating by 25 percent. The treatment effect of cost SMS, health SMS, and social SMS appears to be persistent even after 1 year. Overall, our results suggest that cost concern and underestimation of health consequences are the two main reasons for aversion to electric heating, and the latter can be mitigated by providing households with correct health information.九、金燁Ye Jin, NYU ShanghaiCoordination via DelayAbstract: We propose a new communication protocol in binary-action coordination games with Pareto-ranked equilibria, which involves an option to delay. In the first period, players choose between committing to the risk-dominant (safe) action or delaying their choices. Players who wait then choose between the risk-dominant and payoff-dominant (efficient) actions in the second period. The delay option enables forward-induction reasoning, whereby a player’s decision not to choose the risk-dominant action early signals an intention to choose the payoff-dominant action later. Assume that players have e-social preferences, i.e., they help other players if at no cost to themselves. Iterated weak dominance then yields a unique strategy profile whereby each player waits and then chooses the payoff-dominant action if and only if everyone else waited, which leads to efficient coordination. In an experiment, most subjects adopt the unique iteratively undominated strategy, and, thus, the introduction of the delay option significantly promotes efficiency.

15：20-17：20

十、何超Chao He, East China Normal UniversityStrategic Hospital RunsAbstract: Hospital runs are devastating when low-risk patients crowd out high-risk ones. This paper studies a rushing game among patients. Even if immediate treatment is unnecessary, low-risk patients may still strategically seek treatment for future priority in case their condition deteriorates. With SIR (susceptible-infectious-removed) dynamics, runs could start long before the capacity is insufficient for high-risk patients. However, inefficient waiting can also happen as individuals ignore the social cost of future overload. Moreover, hospital runs can be self-fulfilling. Many countries prevents crowding out by excluding low-risk patients from treatment, but we find this policy is usually dominated by a priority policy.十一、陳力聞Liwen Chen, East China Normal UniversityDoes it pay to have peers with cadre parents? Evidence from ChinaAbstract: We utilize random classroom assignments in China’s junior high schools to study the spillover effects of peer parental elite status on students’ achievements. Using data from the China Education Panel Survey (CEPS), we document a causal relationship between classmates’ parental cadre status and students’ academic performance, non-cognitive skills, and occupational aspirations. Specifically, in classrooms with a higher proportion of cadre parents, students have better academic performance than their counterparts in classrooms with a lower proportion of cadre parents. These students are also more frequently participate in social activities and interact with classmates. We don’t find evidence showing that the within-classroom proportion of peers’ cadre parents changes students’ educational expectations and occupational aspirations. We find that the adjustment of parenting style is a crucial mediating channel. Parents exposed to more cadre parents interact more with teachers and other parents, have higher expectations on their children’s educational attainments, and care more about their children’s homework and friend-circle. Using a different sample, we find suggestive evidence showing that the parenting style changes are even more prominent when parents observe cadre parents’ intervention on random classroom assignments.十二、張煥人Huanren Zhang, University of Southern DenmarkValue creation and value appropriation in strategic partnershipsAbstract: Strategic alliances are coopetitive in nature as they incorporate both cooperation and competition: partners cooperate to use their complementary resources for joint value creation while simultaneously compete to appropriate the created value. We study this tension between value creation and value appropriation both theoretically and experimentally by modeling coopetition as the interaction between two players. The experimental results demonstrate that, contrary to the game-theoretical analysis and to the conventional wisdom, existing competition does not undermine value creation within the alliance. Instead, initial experience has shown to have a significant influence on alliance performance and sustainability: relationships that successfully establish trust at the start are likely to sustain high cooperation level and achieve the efficient outcome even after the market condition has changed. The persistent effect of past experience can be explained by conditional strategies: players adjust their allocation of resources in the direction matching their opponents’ investment level in the previous round. The results imply that a positive mindset towards coopetitive alliance, especially in the presence of intense competition, is the prerequisite for a conducive alliance. The study makes one of the first attempts to employ the experimental method to enrich our understandings on the trade-off between value creation and value appropriation, and it contributes to the literature of coopetition and strategic alliances.十三、黃凌波Lingbo Huang, Nanjing Audit UniversityHow do Alliances Grow and Conflict Ensue? An Experiment on Conflict Network FormationAbstract: We conduct an experiment on a network formation game in which players can either befriend or attack another player in real time. Each pair of players forms an alliance if both send a friendly link to each other; they become rivals if at least one player attacks by sending a rival link. Using a within-subject design, we vary the cost of attacking and test whether a group reaches either a peaceful outcome in which all members are mutual friends or a bullying outcome in which three members form an alliance and all three attack the fourth member. Consistent with the theory prediction, over 90% groups reached either the peaceful or bullying outcome. Furthermore, there is a threshold level of the cost beyond which groups are significantly more likely to maintain peace instead of ending up in the bullying situation. The continuous time feature of our design provides a rich context to explore the dynamics of alliance formation and conflict. We find that some group-level state variables of the network in the first few seconds strongly predict the final network formation. Among groups that converge to the bullying outcome, forming a three-member alliance tends to precede coordinating on a common rival. Furthermore, a player who receives the first ever attack from any other players is far more likely to be the final common rival than other players, and these players’ efforts to escape from being bullied are mostly futile.